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Abstract. There has been considerable discussion surrounding the bar-
riers to spectrum sharing in the literature. Among those is the `trust
gap' that exists, according to the PCAST report. Trust is a complex
human construct that signiﬁcantly includes risk. In this paper, we exam-
ine the risks faced by the diﬀerent user classes proposed by the FCC for
sharing in the 3.5 GHz band. We argue that the invisible hands of spec-
trum sharing in this band is the balance between spectrum sharing gain
and associated risks. We ﬁnd that both gains and risks can be linked to
the distance between incumbents' systems and Citizen Broadband Radio
Services (CBRS)' systems. The risk portfolio is linked to spectrum rights
that each tier has, since the rights they have determine risks and risk
mitigation strategies. We further propose a model to calculate spectrum
sharing utilities for diﬀerent tiers. The optimized utility determines the
distance between incumbents and CBRS systems.
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1 Introduction
On April 21, 2015, Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released the Re-
port and Order (R&O) for the 3.5 GHz band [FCC (2015)]. In this document,
FCC describes the creation of Citizens Broadband Radio Service (CBRS) for
this band, which will be implemented by allowing non-federal users to share spec-
trum with incumbents. Incumbents include Department of Defense (DoD) Radar
Systems in 3550-3650 MHz band, Fixed Satellite Services (FSS) and grandfa-
thered terrestrial wireless operations in 3650-3700 MHz. The sharing arrange-
ment between federal and non-federal usage will take place under a three-tiered
sharing framework enabled by a Spectrum Access System (SAS). The highest
tier, incumbent users, receives interference protection from other users. The
CBRS itself contains two tiers: Priority Access Licenses (PALs) and General Au-
thorized Access (GAA). PAL holders receive interference protection from GAA
applications. GAA users receives no interference protection from other CBRS
users.
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This three tier spectrum sharing arrangement only provides a spectrum shar-
ing framework. It does not promise a future with widely adopted spectrum shar-
ing. Thus, promoting spectrum sharing in 3.5 GHz is an important question
after FCC's rulemaking. Otherwise, 3.5 GHz may face the same situation as
TVWS, which opened unlicensed access in 2008 but has not been widely utilized
[Robyn et.al. (2015)].
An underlying reason for the slow adoption of spectrum sharing is that there
are risks associated with this approach. Incumbents are understandably con-
cerned about potential interference, so they defend their rights to licensed fre-
quencies. Potential CBRS users are uncertain about the regulation and spec-
trum environment (i.e., their usage rights as well as the collective action rights
[Weiss et.al.(2015)]) so both service providers and device manufacturers may be
cautious about spectrum sharing in 3.5 GHz3.
In order to promote spectrum sharing in 3.5 GHz, it is essential that risk
management strategies for each usage tier in 3.5 GHz be developed. Since the
rights, missions, applications, etc. vary with usage tier. Spectrum users of each
tier face diﬀerent risks than users of other tiers and thus need speciﬁc strategies
to cope with these risks. To address this, we analyze spectrum sharing in 3.5 GHz
with the speciﬁc purpose of clarifying the rights and quantifying risks for each
tier as well as identifying appropriate risk management. Finally, we analyze the
trade oﬀ between beneﬁts associate spectrum sharing and costs associate with
risk. This trade oﬀ is the invisible hand behind spectrum sharing that determines
the size of exclusion and protection zone, and applications in CBRS.
2 Rights in 3.5 GHz
Risks and rights may be closely coupled with one another when rights are poorly
deﬁned. So we begin by introducing the users of 3.5 GHz and their de jure and
de facto rights. We begin by a brief reprise of the rights framework discussed in
[?, Weiss et.al.(2015)]
In her work, the Nobel prize winning economist Elinor Ostrom attended to
the rights and governance of so-called common pool resource systems. These are
systems in which one user's consumption diminishes another user's consumption
opportunities (i.e., the uses are subtractible or rivalrous) and in which ex-
clusion is diﬃcult or costly. [Weiss et.al.(2015)] argued that spectrum best ﬁts
this type of good under the current technology endowment. They also modiﬁed
Ostrom's rights framework as shown in Table 1. This table describes the rights
endowment of ﬁve diﬀerent user types for ﬁve diﬀerent types of rights. The ﬁrst
two rights (i.e., Reception and Transmission) can be considered usage rights
because they relate to the operation of the how the system is used, while the
3 In his keynote address to IEEE DySPAN in 2015, Dr. Ranveer Chandra of Microsoft
Research indicated that ASICs for TVWS had been designed, but that their man-
ufacture was deferred until suﬃcient demand for TVWS devices could be demon-
strated.
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remaining three are referred to as collective action rights and refer to the design
of the rights system. In particular, management rights refer how the resource is
used and managed, exclusion rights refer the determination of who has access to
the resource, and alienation rights refer to the rights to transfer any of the other
rights.
In spectrum sharing systems, interference is inevitable, which introduces risk.
Thus, we brieﬂy discuss interference from the perspective of this framework. In
a prior paper, we examined the possibility of creating a right out of what might
otherwise be considered an externality4 [Weiss and Cui(2012)]. Referring to
the framework in Table 1, interference occurs when a signal from one authorized
sender impinges on another authorized receiver.5 In general, this occurs as an
unexpected result of the management regime that was determined through the
exercise of collective action rights, even if it is the result abnormal propagation
circumstances.
Full Prop- Auth. Auth. Auth.
owner rietor claimant sender rcvr
Reception X X X X X
Transmission X X X X
Management X X X
Exclusion X X
Alienation X
Table 1. Distribution of rights by user type
With this background in mind, we examine the stakeholders in the 3.5GHz
band.
2.1 Incumbents
The current spectrum allocation in 3.5 GHz band is already very complicated.
Through the collective action processes of the CSMAC and FCC, the entire
3550-3700 MHz was divided into two sub-bands: 3550-3650 MHz and 3650-3700
MHz. A two tiered hierarchical usage rights scheme was developed for each sub-
band (an exercise of the management rights) that are called primary usage and
secondary usage. Further, both federal and non-federal usage was permitted
under both primary and secondary usage. We begin with primary usage in the
3550-3650 MHz sub-band: The R&O granted primary usage rights to limited
non-federal Fixed Satellite Service (FSS) if they existed prior to the eﬀective
date of the R&O. As well, federal ﬁxed and mobile (except aeronautical mobile)
4 In economics, an externality is a cost or beneﬁt that aﬀects a party who did not
choose to incur that cost or beneﬁt (Source: Wikipedia).
5 Rogue transmissions are from unauthorized senders and so fall outside of this frame-
work.
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radar systems were given primary usage rights. The R&O granted subordinate
(i.e., secondary) usage rights to Federal Radio Location Services (RLS) and
certain low power non-Federal applications.
3650-3700 MHz is less crowded than 3550-3650 sub-band. Here, primary us-
age rights are granted to some Federal RLS sites and ships for radar. Secondary
usage rights are granted to wireless broadband services.
Superior (i.e. primary) usage rights imply the right to receive without inter-
ference from authorized suboardinate (secondary) users. Stated diﬀerently, this
means that incumbents have the highest priority in spectrum access. But this
classiﬁcation does not address interference between diﬀerent rights holders of the
same class. That is, do some users have super-primary rights? Some DoD radar
systems including ground-based, shipborne, and airborne platforms, which are
used in conjunction with weapons control systems, may cause interference even
to other primary users. In addition, incumbents with primary usage rights have
the right to deploy both ﬁxed and mobile transmitters that in line with their
mission.
2.2 Citizens Broadband Radio Service
The authorization of CBRS rights is limited by inferiority to the primary users'
rights. Further, the R&O envisions two further tiers: Priority Access Licensees
(PALs) and General Authorized Access (GAA). In the framework of Table 1,
PAL usage rights are superior to GAA usage rights.
Both classes of users have collective action rights through the FCC process. Of
these, management rights are the most dynamic since the licensing procedures for
PALs addresses exclusion rights. One important challenge ex ante in the domain
of exercising management rights is the question of appropriately balancing the
spectrum allocation between PALs and GAA. This must be accomplished ex
ante since PALs will be auctioned (see below). PALs need to be suﬃciently
attractive to attract bids while simultaneously fostering a robust GAA ecosystem
for innovation.
Considering the comments and suggestions from diﬀerent stakeholders, the
FCC concluded that a maximum of 70 MHz, 7 channels (10 MHz each), should
be reserved for PALs in any given license area at any time. In addition, every
PAL can aggregate up to four channels in any given license area to encourage
competition. The remainder of the available frequencies is made available for
GAA usage. The deﬁnitions are as follows:
PALs Any prospective licensee who meets basic FCC qualiﬁcations is eligible
for PALs. All applicants for PALs must demonstrate their qualiﬁcation to
hold an authorization and demonstrate how a grant of authorization would
serve the public interest. Census tracts is the license size for PALs. PALs have
three-year non-renewable license terms - with the ability to aggregate up to
six years up-front. Finally, PALs will be assigned by competitive bidding.
GAA FCC reasoned that a license-by-rule licensing framework would allow for
rapid deployment of small cells by a wide range of users, including consumers,
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enterprises, and service providers, at low cost and with minimal barriers to
entry.
GAA users may only use FCC certiﬁed Citizens Broadband Radio Services
Devices (CBSDs) and must register with the SAS. Consistent with rules gov-
erning CBSDs, devices operating on a GAA basis must provide the SAS with
all information requirement by the rules, including operator identiﬁcation,
device identiﬁcation, and geo-location information, upon initial registration
and as required by the SAS. Moreover, only ﬁxed CBSDs are allowed at this
stage.
We now translate this policy into the rights framework of Table 1. According
to the R&O,
To ensure that essential federal radiolocation systems operating in
the band continue their operations without impact from the sharing
arrangements, we are prohibiting CBSDs from causing harmful inter-
ference to, or claiming protection from, federal stations aboard vessels
(shipborne radars) and at designated groundbased radar sites. In addi-
tion, authorized users of CBSDs must not claim protection from airborne
radars and airborne radar receivers must not claim protection from CB-
SDs operating in the Citizens Broadband Radio Service."
The notion of interference protection in this exerpt from the R&O means that
the transmission rights of CBSDs are subordinate to the receiving rights of the
incumbent users. Furthermore, this management regime does not limit Federal
RLS transmission rights in order to preserve CBSDs reception rights. That is,
they do not have the right of interference protection from incumbents. Trans-
mission and reception rights are similarly organized within CBRS so that PALs'
reception rights are superior to GAA's transmission rights (i.e., they have the
right of interference protection from GAA users); like RLS, GAA users have
no rights of interference protection from incumbent and other Citizens Broad-
band Radio Service users. This management and exclusion regime is encoded in
a Spectrum Access System (SAS), which is a spatial database that is used to
implement the rights regime described the the previous paragraph in real time.
3 Invisible Hands behind Spectrum Sharing in 3.5 GHz
In 1776, Adam Smith mentioned the invisible hand" in his classic book The
Wealth of Nations" to describe the natural force that guides free market capital-
ism through competition for scare resources. He pointed out that no regulation
of any type would be necessary to ensure the mutually beneﬁcial exchange of
good and services in a free market, since the invisible hand" (the intent that
each participant tried to maximize self-interest) will lead to the most mutually
beneﬁcial manner.
There is an invisible hand" in spectrum sharing in 3.5 GHz as well. Although
the exclusion and protection zone is currently determined by incumbents and
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regulators, a boundary can be determined voluntarily when considering both
the beneﬁt of spectrum sharing and cost associated with risks. For example, two
extreme cases may exist: (1) when advanced technology can control all transmit-
ters and monitor spectrum usage in real-time at low cost, the exclusion zone will
be very small if it even exists; (2) when it is diﬃcult to control transmitters and
monitor spectrum usage in a timely manner and cost eﬀective way, the exclusion
zone will be very large.
3.1 Risks in 3.5 GHz
According to TAC, there are three categories to evaluate risks: (1) corporate
metrics, (2) service metrics, (3) RF metrics. Coporate metrics include the ability
to complete a mission, loss in revenue and proﬁts. Service metrics measures the
availability and quality of the service. RF metrics measure signal to interference
and noise ratios, absolute interfering signal level, etc [FCC (2015)].
In this paper, RF metric is evaluated by interference estimation described
in section 3.1, service metrics is evaluated by spectrum access opportunities de-
scribed in section 3.1, and the corporate metric is evaluated by proﬁt that gained
wireless service providers described in section 3.2. Moreover, as a wireless service
provider, they do not passively accept risks. Instead, users with diﬀerent rights
have various strategies to cope with risks. Section 3.1 describes risk mitigation
strategies for each tier.
Interference Estimation The primary RF risk for incumbents is that CBSDs
may bring harmful interference to their systems, which negatively impacts their
ability to carryer out their mission. Similarly, CBSDs also have risks in receiving
interference. Speciﬁcally, PALs may receive interference from incumbents, and
GAAs may receive interference from both incumbents and PALs. We determine
the potential interference that comes from a higher tier to the lower tier. For
example, PALs estimate the interference that comes from incumbents, and GAAs
estimate the interference that comes from both incumbents and PALs.
Although we don't have the information on transmission power level, we
can follow the reverse engineer the NTIA exclusion zone calculations. First, we
determine the maximum interference level that PALs and GAAs can accept. We
assume that PALs can accept interference level (IP ) up to -20 dBm and GAAs
can only accept interference level (IG) up to -30 dBm. Then, we adopt the same
path loss model Lp that NTIA used for calculating exclusion zones. Finally, the
acceptable incumbent transmission power (XP ) is determined as XP = IP +Lp
and XG = IG + Lp for PALs and GAAs respectively.
Lp =69.55 + 26.16 log f − 13.82 log hb − a(hm)
+ (44.0− 6.55 log hb) log d
(1)
a(hm) =
{
3.2(log(11.75hm))
2 − 4.97, L City
(1.1 log(f − 0.7)hm − 1.56 log f + 0.8, M/S City
(2)
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Therefore, the probability of interference is determined as:
P (Pt > X
i) = 1− 1
2
[1 + erf(
x− µ
σ
√
2pi
)], i = P,G (3)
when we assume the transmission power level (Pt) follows a normal distribution,
Pt =
1
σ
√
2pi
e
−
(x− µ)2
2σ2 , with mean µ and deviation σ.
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Fig. 1. Probability of receiving interference from incumbents σ = 10
Fig.1 and Fig.2 show the probability of interference for situations with re-
spect to the distance between transmitters and receivers, CBSDs' interference
threshold, and path loss model in large and medium/small city. We assume that
µ = 82 dBm, σ = 10 and σ = 100 in Fig.1 and Fig.2 respectively. It is clear that
when the distance (d) between transmitters and receiver stays the same, PALs
in a large city (PL) have the lowest probability of interference because PALs
have less sensitivity to interference than GAAs and the path loss in a large city
is more severe than a medium/small city. When the path loss decreases (in the
medium/small city case), the probability of interference increases in PMS. A sim-
ilar pattern can be recognized for GAAs. Further, GAAs have higher probability
of interference in the same geographic region than PALs, since GAA's interfer-
ence threshold is higher than PALs. Moreover, the probability of interference
decreases with increases of d, due to the path loss factor. Compare Fig.1 and
Fig.2, when σ increase from 10 to 100, the transmission power is less centralized
to the mean. Therefore, the probability of interference increases.
Spectrum Access Opportunities Estimation According to the R&O, all
frequency bands that are not occupied by incumbents and PALs can be utilized
by GAAs. In the ideal case, GAAs have at least 80 MHz in any geographic
areas outside the exclusion zones (recall that the total shareable frequency is
150 MHz, 70 MHz is allocated to PALs, so the remaining 80 MHz can be used
for GAAs.) Let us calculate the spectrum access opportunities for GAAs on
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Fig. 2. Probability of receiving interference from incumbents σ = 100
those 80 MHz. It is assumed that GAAs can perfectly detect each other and
there is no interference from PALs and incumbents.
Since GAAs are controlled by a SAS on a FCFS base, we adopt a queue-
ing model to quantify the probability of the spectrum access opportunity. It is
assumed that GAAs arrival process follows a Poisson distribution with mean
λ, and the departure process follows exponential distribution with mean µ. It
is further assumed that the capacity of the system is 8 channels with 10 MHz
bandwidth. Consequently, we adopt M/M/C queue with C = 8.
The most important metric is the probability of waiting (PQ). Thus, the
probability of spectrum is available is (1-PQ).
PQ =
∞∑
i=C
Pi =
(Ca)C
C!
1
1− aP0 (4)
where, C is the total number of available channel, a =
λ
µ
and
P0 = (
C−1∑
i=0
(Ca)i
i!
+
(Ca)C
C!(1− a) )
−1 (5)
In the future, we will tailor this probability according to diﬀerent applica-
tions' requirement, such as elastic vs inelastic services by using metrics like mean
waiting time (W ) and probability that waiting time is greater than threshold t
(P (W > t).
Coping with Risks Under a subordinate rights structure, spectrum users with
diﬀerent priority have diﬀerent risk metrics and risk measurement/protection
methods. Spectrum users with higher priority have the right to protect their
own services. However, spectrum users with lower priority can only estimate
risks and make informed decision accordingly.
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Protection
There are many ways to protect the system from interference: geographic sep-
aration, frequency separation, time separation are three dominate approaches.
Since CBRS shares spectrum with current users, incumbents focus on geographic
and time separation. Here, risk protection starts with the incumbents' own re-
quirements, such as Signal to Noise and Interference Ratio (SNIR). Then, incum-
bents determine exclusion (and protection) zone where no one else can operate
based on PALs and GAAs allowable transmission power limits as well as an ap-
propriate path loss model. Even outside the exclusion zones, CBSDs can only
transmit when incumbents are absent.
PALs have interference protection rights over GAAs and focus on frequency
and time separation. This means that PALs have dedicated frequency bands
where no other CBSDs can operate. The time seperation is implemented by the
SAS through explicit grants of GAA's transmission rights, which, in turn, is
based on the PAL's traﬃc.
Estimation
For CBRS, although they do not have the right of interference protection
from incumbents, they can actively cope with risks by estimating potential risks
before hand and then making informed decisions and using ﬂexible management.
CBRSs may have diﬀerent goals; for example, hospitals and public safety provide
life critical services that can hardly be measured by money while commercial
services can be evaluated by revenue and customer satisfaction.
Accordingly, we will estimate risks for Citizens Broadband Radio Services
from the QoS perspective and then link it to potential revenue. Two risk metrics
are applied in analyzing QoS.
 Probability of interference. In this metric, spectrum users calculate the prob-
ability that they may be interfered by users with higher priority.
 Probability of getting spectrum without waiting. This risk metric only applies
to GAAs, since they do not have spectrum reservation.
When we link QoS to potential revenue, we assume that the maximum rev-
enue that CBSDs can earn occurs when there is no interference and spectrum
is available all the time. We assume that the potential revenue that CBSDs can
earn linearly decreases with probability of interference and the probability of
waiting for available spectrum.
3.2 Beneﬁt for CBRS
The invisible hands behind the spectrum sharing is to maximize the overall
beneﬁt getting from spectrum sharing in 3.5 GHz. We assume that the beneﬁt
for spectrum sharing with PALs (UP ) is calculated as the maximum beneﬁt per
user (up) times number of users/devices covered by PALs (Npc ). Moreover, this
maximum value can be achieve when there is no interference from incumbents
(1− P I(i)) as shown in equation 6.
UP = up ×Npc × (1− P I(i)); (6)
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GAA are more poorly situated than PALs, since they accept interference
from both incumbents and PALs. Also, they cannot reserve spectrum, since the
SAS allocates frequency bands to GAA on a FCFS basis. In other words, GAAs
can provide services when spectrum is available. As a result, there are three risk
metrics for GAAs: the probability of getting interference from incumbents P I(i),
the probability of getting interference from PALs PG(i), and the probability that
a frequency band is not available right away PQ. The beneﬁt of spectrum sharing
in GAA (UG) equals the maximum beneﬁt per user/device (ug) times number
of users/devices covered by GAA (Ngc ), and this beneﬁt can only be achieved
when spectrum is available without interference (1− P I(i))(1− PP (i))(1− PQ)
as shown in equation 7.
UG = ug ×Ngc × (1− P I(i))× (1− PP (i))× (1− PQ) (7)
According to NTIA exclusion zone calculation, the population density de-
creases with the increase of exclusion zone radius (d). Therefore the Npc and N
g
c
are a function of exclusion zone radius.
N ic =
1
d
× pir2i , i = p, g (8)
In order to calculate beneﬁt of spectrum sharing, we need to start by esti-
mating risks in spectrum sharing (illustrated in section 3.1 and section 3.1).
4 Numerical Results
In this section, we discuss some representative ﬁgures that demonstrate the invis-
ible hands, i.e., the tradeoﬀ between beneﬁt and cost, that determine spectrum
sharing. In Fig.3, the assumption is that user/device density decreases with the
exclusion zone radius (d). Although the interference also decrease with the in-
crease of exclusion zone radius, density in this case is the dominate factor in
determining the utility for PALs. Therefore, the smaller the d is, the higher the
utility.
Fig.4 assumes the user/device density does not change according to the ex-
clusion zone radius. Device to Device (D2D) communication networks can be
one example of this scenario. Clearly, users have higher utility when they are
away from incumbents, since the probability of interference from incumbents
decreases. Further, utilities when σ1 is applied is higher than utilities under σ2,
since the interference level in σ1 is higher than σ2. GAAs utility shows the same
trend with lower utility value.
5 Conclusion
There is currently a great deal of interest in spectrum sharing in the 3.5 GHz
band. Success in this band is likely to encourage spectrum sharing in other bands,
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Fig. 4. PALs utility with constant user/device density
so an important challenge is learn how to incentivize spectrum sharing under this
three tier spectrum sharing prototype while protecting spectrum users' systems
and investment. This is complicated by the presence of risk because the cost-
beneﬁt calculus becomes more complex. In this paper, we sought to identify and
quantify the risks faced by the diﬀerent classes of users users in 3.5 GHz band as
a ﬁrst step to support users' decisionmaking. We did not address the impact of
risk mitigation strategies, which change with the rights that diﬀerent spectrum
users hold.
For Adam Smith, the invisble hand guided markets in equilibrium. In the
case of spectrum sharing, the invisible hand cautions users from investing be-
cause of the risks they face. These risks loom largest in the absence of experience,
so quantifying and modelling the risks is a ﬁrst step toward developing risk miti-
gation strategies that should cause the invisible hand to facilitate transactions
rather than stop them.
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